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The first chapter investigates whether East German women became used to the require-
ment of working full-time under communism and thereby continued to work much longer
hours than did their counterparts in the West after unification. I develop a model for habit
formation in labor supply where the habit to work is formed through working the same
number of hours over time and deviations bring disutility. Using post-unification data form
the German Socio-Economic Panel, I estimate structural labor supply equation derived from
the model and find that there is a habit to work both in East and West Germany as women
in both regions today work hours similar to the hours they worked in the past.
The second chapter develops a rational habit formation model in labor supply using
the idea of habits outlined in the first chapter. I show that the proposed model avoids the
extreme behavior observed in the standard model in the literature where in the long-run
hours of work could increase indefinitely or decrease to zero over time. Rather, the current
model predicts that in the long-run hours of work converge to an average of hours worked
in the past.
The third chapter examines whether disabled elders who have private long-term care in-
surance consume fewer acute or post-acute Medicare covered services. The empirical results
indicate that disabled elders who have long-term care insurance and claim benefits under
their policies have lower probability of accessing Medicare covered home health aide services,
use fewer visits and have lower expenditures for these services per year than do non-insured
disabled elders. Further, private insurance has no impact on the probability, frequency
and expenditures for using skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility and hospital based
services. These findings suggest that as more individuals purchase private long-term care
insurance and begin using it, the use of and expenditures on selected Medicare covered
post-acute care services should decline.
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Chapter 1
Is Working a Habit? Evidence
from Germany after Unification
1.1 Introduction
Under communism East German women had to work full-time. When communism collapsed
so did the political pressure to work, but women in the East continued to work much longer
hours than did their counterparts in the West.
This paper argues that women became used to their work schedules and continued
them even after the work requirement was removed. I follow the psychology literature by
developing a model of habit formation where people get used to working certain number of
hours and dislike changing those hours either upward or downward.
The standard models of habit formation in the labor supply literature by Kubin and
Prinz (2002), Vendrik (1993) and Faria and Leon-Ledesma (2002) have borrowed the Becker
and Murphy's (1988) rational addiction model where habits exist if an increase in hours
worked today leads to an increase in hours worked in the future. In certain cases of the
standard model, hours of work could increase indefinitely or decrease to zero over time
in the long-run. While infinitely increasing or decreasing to zero consumption of certain
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goods can explain some cases of addiction such as alcohol and tobacco, such trends are
not observed in labor supply data. The current model avoids similar extreme behavior by
assuming that people dislike changes in the hours they work and, therefore, continue to
work the same number of hours over time. When labor supply equations derived from both
models are estimated on data from the German Socia-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for East
and West Germany, both models fit the data equally well in terms of R2.
Using data on women from the GSOEP, Figure 1.1 shows the dramatic increase in wages
in the East through the nineties. By 2000, the real hourly wages in the East have almost
reached the level of wages in the West. Considering this evidence alone, economic theory
would suggest that women in the East should increase the hours they work in response to
the wage increase. Figure 1.2 indicates that not only there isn't an increase in hours, but
that the average hours worked in the East stayed constant through the nineties and that
on average hours worked in the East are with 10 higher than those worked in the West.
To further illustrate the difference in the labor supply behavior in the East and the West,
Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of hours worked in 2000 in the two regions!. Even thought
this distribution changed slightly through the nineties in the West to reflect the increase
in part-time workers, roughly half of the women there worked full-time and half part-time
through that period. In the East, on the other hand, the majority of the women worked 40
hours per week in the decade following unification. What we conclude from these few facts is
that even though the economic environment in East Germany changed after unification, the
hours that women there work did not change and remained the same as under communism.
The habit to work today similar number of hours to those worked in the past emerges as a
IFigure 1.3 graphs the kernel density estimates of the hours worked.
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plausible explanation to the striking persistence of full-time work in East Germany.
I do not argue that habits are the only explanation to the observed phenomenon. Rather,
I see an opportunity to test the theory of habits developed in this paper in the pseudo natural
experiment of the German unification, where women in the East were constrained to work
full-time and continued to do so even after the constraint was lifted. I control for other
possible explanations to the persistently high hours of work in the East such as wage rates,
non-earned income and possible" habits" on the side of the employer. The empirical results
indicate that there are habits in both East and West Germany and it can be concluded,
therefore, that the large differences in the hours worked today in the two regions can be
explained by people's preference not to work different hours from those worked in the past.
The habit formation model developed in this paper suggests that East German women,
who have worked the same number of hours year after year under communism, are less
likely today to work different number of hours and, thus, continue to work full-time. West
German women, on the other hand, who were always free to choose their labor supply,
today continue to work full or part-time.
1.2 Background: before and after communism
A woman in a communist East Germany was expected to be a mother and a worker. Legal
provision in the constitution stated that every citizen had a right and an obligation to paid
employment and thus, women's integration into paid employment was supported ideolog-
ically and was equated with equality of sexes and emancipation. Women's participation
in paid employment was also made necessary by the low productivity of a labor-intensive
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economy, which resulted in constant labor shortages.
As the social pattern assigned a high value to motherhood, the communist regime cre-
ated legal provisions and support infrastructure to facilitate the integration of women into
the labor force. One of the most important provisions was the expansion of the capacity
of childcare facilities for children of all ages. These facilities provided full-time care and
facilitated the full-time employment of women. In the 1980s places were available for more
than 80 percent of the children below school age and even for those under the age of three.
In West Germany, in contrast, childcare facilities were open only for half-day and childcare
for children under the age of three did not exist. It was, therefore, much harder for West
German women to return to work full-time.
The economic, monetary and social union between the two German states on July 1, 1990
marked the beginning of the transformation of East Germany from a centrally planned to
a market economy. This entailed, among other things, a drastic change in the labor market
structure. Holding a job was no longer a "citizen's" right but was determined by the demand
side of the market. The support infrastructure for women was quickly dismantled which was
mostly reflected in the drastic reduction in the capacity of childcare facilities. In addition,
Western regulations, now adopted in the East, such as the entitlement to a long parental
leave, were thought to introduce a detachment from the work force and thus a disincentive
to work full-time.
One may think, therefore, that the employment patterns of the East German women
would converge to the ones of the West German women. Yet, on average, Eastern women
who had a job, worked close to 40 hours per week while the employed women in the West
worked either 20 or 40 hours per week through the 1990's, as seen in Figure 1.3.
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Possible explanations to why women in the East work so much more than women in
the West, even after they were allowed to choose their hours freely, may lie in the economic
changes in the East following unification. Wages in the East dramatically increased through
the 90's (the median real monthly consumption wage of East German workers aged 18 to
54 rose by 83 percent from 1990 to 1996) and women might have continued to work full-
time to take advantage of this increase. In addition, the fertility rates in the East dropped
significantly after the unification, Lechner (1998), and the disincentive to work, caused
by the lack of childcare facilities might have been less important in the East. Habits on
the side of employers in the East, where employers used to offering only full-time jobs
during communism continue to do so after its collapse, could be another explanation to
the differences in labor supply in the East and West. This explanation although plausible,
does not seem to be likely as the large number of job creation measures implemented in the
East right after unification were to a large extent reflected in part-time jobs. As a result
part-time jobs between 1991 and 2001 more than doubled in the East, Spitznagel (2003).
1.3 Existing models in the literature
No study so far has looked at the striking difference in labor supply in terms of hours
worked between East and West Germany after unification. Bonin and Euwals (2001) study
the differences in labor force participation rates and conclude that regional differences in
attitudes towards labor supply have become less important over the years and that East
German characteristics have changed towards preference for labor supply. Bonin and Eu-
wals, however, examined differences only in the labor force participation and not in the
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hours worked and overlooked habits as a possible explanation to the labor supply behavior
in post-unification Germany.
While there is a large theoretical and empirical work on habit formation with respect
to consumption, there are few studies which examine the role of habits in a labor supply
context. Studies by Faria and Leon-Ledesma (2002) and Kubin and Prinz (2002) follow
closely the Becker and Murphy's (1988) theory of rational addiction. This theory predicts
that habits exists when there is a positive relationship between labor supply today and
in the past and defines no limits on the "strength of addiction" or on the coefficient by
which current consumption increases (decreases) when the stock of consumption increases
(decreases). As increase in consumption today leads to increase in the stock tomorrow which
in turn leads to increase in consumption in the following period and so on, it is not surprising
that in the long-run it is possible for an individual addicted to a good to increase his or
her consumption of the good indefinitely or to decrease it down to zero. Translating this
addiction theory to a labor supply framework with habits, then suggests that an individual
who has a habit to work could increase his or her hours of work indefinitely or decrease
them to zero in the long-run. I argue that while such corner solutions may explain certain
kinds of addictions, they cannot explain labor supply behavior as we do not usually observe
in data increasing over time or decreasing to zero hours of work.
The empirical literature on habits in labor supply is also scarce. The major study
in the literature by Woitteiz and Kaptyen (1998) estimates a linear approximation to a
labor supply equation which is derived from a theoretical model following the Becker and
Murphy's addiction theory. Woitteiz and Kaptyen (1998) test for the presence of habits
through the significance of lagged hours of work. My empirical work differs from theirs
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since it is based on an alternative analytical model where I estimate a structural labor
supply equation derived from that model.
In summary, the persisting differences in the labor supply behavior in East and West
Germany after unification have not been studied and an attempt to explain those differences
with a theory based on the psychological notion that people get used to working a certain
number of hours is a contribution to the literature.
1.4 The model
The main idea of the habit model in this study ensues from the notion that a person
can develop a habit for a certain activity through a repetition of this activity and any
disruption in that repetition brings disutility. I consider a habit to work to be present when
an individual chooses to work today hours H t similar to an average of past hours worked
H t when everything else is hold constant. As reflected in the utility function, deviations
from that average in either direction bring disutility to the individual.
1.4.1 Short-run labor supply
A representative worker is assumed to maximize a utility function which is quadratic in
consumption, Ct , in leisure Lt and in deviations of the hours worked today H
t
from a
weighted average of hours worked in all prior periods H
t
:
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where Ut > 0, Uc > 0, Uu = au < 0, Uce = ace < °and <p 2": 0. H t is an exponentially
weighted average of hours worked in all prior periods and is defined as:
t
Ht == 6"L(l- 6")jHt - 1- j ,
j=O
(1.2)
where t is the number of periods an individual has worked and ~ is the depreciation param-
eter of habits, 0 < 6" ~ 1. The exponentially weighted average places more importance on
more recent hours by discounting hours worked in the past in an exponential manner.
A change in the exponentially weighted average of hours worked can then be expressed
as:
(1.3)
Habits exist when working today hours Ht which are higher or lower than the average hours
worked in the past H t brings disutility to the representative worker. A positive coefficient
'P reflects the presence of habits, while a coefficient 'P equal to zero indicates that habits are
not important to the utility of the individual.
The representative worker maximizes the above utility function subject to the time and
budget constraints:
(1.4)
(1.5)
where T is the total number of hours available for work and leisure in a day, At is unearned
income, Wt is the wage rate and Pt is the price of consumption.
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The Lagrangian then becomes:
(1.6)
The first order conditions with respect to Ct and H t are:
(1.7)
(1.8)
The short-run labor supply equation derived from the first order conditions of the model
has the following form:
Differentiating Ht with respect to Ht , I obtain:
o< aHt == ---cp--- < 1,
- aHt w 2
'P - au - acc~
(1.9)
(1.10)
2which is always greater or equal to zero and less than one as cp ~ 0 and -Gu - Gcc;;r > 0.,
The first part of the inequality in equation (1.10) indicates that the coefficient on H
t
in equation (1.9) is always positive or equal to zero, given that my assumptions about the
parameters of the utility function hold, or that au < °,ace < 0, and cp ~ 0. The second
part of the inequality shows that the coefficient on H t in equation (1.9) is less than one
which has important implications for the long-run dynamics of the model as discussed in
the next section.
The model assumes myopic habit formation where the individual does not take into
account the feedback of his or her current actions for future preferences. In rational habit
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models, on the other hand, the individual has perfect foresight and fully takes into account
the future costs or benefits of his or her present decision. Chapter 2 of my dissertation
extends the current model to a rational habit formation model, where individuals maximize
the utility function over their lifetime and where time preference for the present is relatively
small. The rational model, however, does not rule out strong discount of future events where
the time preference for the present increases and individuals become more and more myopic.
In the extreme case, when the time preference for the present goes to infinity, the rational
habit formation model developed in Chapter 2 of my dissertation becomes equivalent to the
myopic model developed in this paper2 .
1.4.2 Long-run dynamics
In the long-run, the exponentially weighted average of hours worked H t does not change over
time so let H*denote that long-run value. For a constant Wt = W and At = A, a long-run or
stationary equilibrium solution H* to the model is obtained by substituting H
t
- H
t
-
1
= 0
in equation (1.3). Line 81 8 1 in Figure 1.4 represents the long-run equilibrium and line 8282
represents the short-run labor supply function from equation (1.9). A long-run labor supply
function is obtained when the long-run equilibrium condition H* == H* is substituted in
2In a rational habit formation model an agent maximizes a utility function with a constant rate of time
preference (J' and a number of periods during which the agent works t:
If the time preference for the present (J' goes to infinity, then the utility fnction is maximized only over one
period and the model become a myopic model of habit formation:
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equation (1.9). The long-run labor supply function the will be of the form:
(1.11)
(1.12)
The labor supply will move to such an equilibrium only when it is locally stable and the
condition for stability of the steady state is ~~: < 13 • The condition for stable steady state
then is:
8H* <p
aH* = 'P - all - acc~ < 1,
and as we saw from equation (1.10) this condition is always fulfilled if all < 0 , a cc < 0,
and <p ~ 0. Therefore, there is only a stable steady state in the long-run where the hours
worked H converge to the equilibrium value H*.
1.4.3 Comparison with the standard model
This section outlines briefly the theoretical differences between the current model and the
standard model in the literature. The utility function in the standard model, Vendrik
(1993),4 is of the form:
(1.13)
where U1 > 0, Ue > 0, Ull = all < 0, Uee == ace < 0, alk < 0, and K t is the habit stock. The
habit stock is not an average but rather a summation where the most recent hours worked
have more weight then the hours worked in the past. The habit stock is equal to:
K t = H t - 1 + H t - 2 + ... + Ho = H t - 1 + (1 - 8)Kt- 1 , (1.14)
3The condition for asypmtotically stable equilibrium states that if yo is a rest point of the differential
equation iJ == f(y) where f(yo) == 0, then Yo is an asymptotically stable equilibrium if f' (Yo) < O. Applied
I -* 8H* 8H*
to our problem, f (H ) ==~ - 1 < 0 or 81ft < 1 needs to be true for stability of the steady state.
t t
4This is a modifciation of the original utility function of Vendrik (1993), where the habit stock is with
respect to leisure and Qlk is positive. The implications of the model, however, are the same; at steady state
hours of work are infinitely increasing or decreasing to zero.
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where 0 < 8 < 1 is the rate of depreciation of the habit stock. The utility function is
maximized subject to the budget constraints in equations (1.4) and (1.5) and the following
short-run labor supply function is obtained:
(1.15)
The long-run equilibrium condition is H* == 8K* and the condition for long-run stability
of the steady state is g~: < 8. It can be seen from equation (1.15) and the restrictions on
the parameters of the utility function that g~: == -Olk w 2 is not always smaller than 8
-all -occ 17
and thus unstable steady states can exist for certain values of the parameters. Figure 1.5
illustrates such an unstable steady state where the hours worked can increase indefinitely
or decrease to zero. The line 8181 in Figure 1.5 represents the long-run equilibrium and line
828 2 represents the short-run labor supply function from equation (1.15).
In the following section I estimate the model that I develop in the paper to see whether
habits, defined as a repetition of an activity over time, exist in the labor supply behavior
of women in Germany.
1.5 Estimation
The structural parameters of equation (1.9) are estimated separately for a younger and
older cohorts of East and West Germany women to determine whether habits exist in the
two regions and whether they differ by age. Women in the younger cohort are 35 years old
or younger at unification and those in the older cohort are between the ages of 36 and 45
at unification.
I also estimate the structural parameters of equation (1.15) for a younger and older
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cohorts of East and West German women to compare how the two models fit the data. I
assume that prices Pt and the total time devoted to leisure and work in a day T are equal
to one, and constraint the parameter of the utility function Qll to be equal to negative one.
Further, I specify the marginal utility of leisure at zero hours of leisure, ai, to be
dependent on personal and family characteristics, i.e. al = j3Xit + Pi + cit where X it
includes age, education, children, non-earned income, occupation and dummies for working
in different sectors of the industry.
Given the nature of the problem, I believe that the unobserved individual fixed ef-
fects Pi are correlated with the regressors X it and to account for the endogeneity I take
deviations from time means. I approximate the non-linear function of my model Hit
j(Hit ,Wit, Ait , j3Xit + Pi + cit) and the non-linear function of the standard model Hit
j(Kit ,Wit, Ait , j3Xit+fi+V it) with non-linear functions of the form Hit = j(Hit ,Wit, A it , j3Xit )+
Pi + eit and Hit == f(Kit , Wit, Ait , /3Xit ) + Ei + Vit so that I can difference away unobserved
individual fixed effect Pi when I take deviations from time means.
The model that I develop and the standard model that I estimate are of the following
form:
(1.16)
and
(1.17)
1.5.1 Data
I use data from the GSOEP for East and West German women for the years 1990 to 2000 to
estimate the model presented in this paper. I include in the sample only those women who
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participated in the survey for all 11 years of the panel in order to minimize the measurement
error when calculating Ht as a weighted average of hours worked in the past. The sample
also includes only women who are younger that 46 in 1990 in order to exclude older women
who have the opportunity for early retirement. Excluded from the sample are self-employed
women and women who are receiving their vocational training at the time of the interview.
After removing women with missing values, I am left with 300 to 356 observations per year
of East German women and with 320 to 467 observations per year of West German women.
For the East German sample I calculate Ht as an exponentially weighted average of all
hours worked in the past, where I assume that the depreciation rate 8 is equal to .5. I am
able to calculate Ht for all years worked, because I know when each person in the sample
started working and, therefore, how long each person worked under communism. I assume
that all women in the sample worked 40 hour per week during communism and that 1989
is the last year of the communist regime. I assume that H t is based only on positive hours
of work supplied in the past and I calculate Ht to be the weighted average only of reported
positive hours of work.
For the West German sample H t is calculated as an exponentially weighted average of all
hours worked from 1984 forward, as 1984 is the first year for which data on West Germany
are collected. The depreciation rate 8 is also assumed to be .5 and H t is calculated only for
positive hours of work supplied in the past.
Summary statistics are provided in Table 1.1. The data supports the known socia-
demographic and labor facts about Germany. The average hours worked in the East are
almost constant and close to 40 through the nineties. The weekly hours worked in the West
decrease slowly through the nineties from 33 in 1990 to 29 in 2000. This decline is due to
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the increasing number of part-time workers in the West.
The real wages per hour in the East, reported on an hourly basis because of the differ-
ences in the hours worked in the East and the West, have increased significantly through
the nineties and have almost reached the level of the wages in the West. This reflects the
effort of the West after unification to equalize the wages in the country. While the wages
of the Eastern men increased as well, they lag further behind those of the men in the West.
As expected, in the early years after unification, lower percentage of women in the East
than in the West owned a home. Towards the end of the decade, however, the percentage
of women in the East who owned a home almost reached the one in the West indicating an
upward trend in the economic well-being of Eastern women.
Higher proportion of women in the East than in the West have children in the zero
to six and seven to sixteen age categories right after unification which might be a result
of the family oriented policies of the communist regime. The percentage of women in the
East with younger children, however, sharply declined in the later part of the decade which
reflects the declining fertility of Eastern women after unification.
Similar percentages of women in the East and the West have completed vocational train-
ing, while much higher proportion of women in the East than in the West have university
education.
The average age of women in the East and the West is the same but a higher proportion
of women in the East are married.
Dummy variables for seven industry sectors: agriculture, mining and utilities, construc-
tion, manufacturing, trade and transport, services, and government, are included in the
estimation to control for "habit" on the side of the employer, or for a prevalence of full or
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part-time work regime in a given sector.
1.6 Estimation results
The estimation results for the two cohorts and the two models are reported in Table 1.2
for East Germany and in Table 1.3 for West Germany. Columns 1 and 3 in the two tables
report the estimates of my model for the younger and the older East and West German
cohorts, and columns 2 and 4 report the estimates of the standard model for the younger
and the older East and West German cohorts.
First, it should be noted that the R2 of the two models are exactly the same for all
specifications. However, even though the two models perform equally well empirically, my
model has more appropriate for a labor supply framework theoretical predictions as it avoids
the prediction of infinitely increasing to infinity or decreasing to zero hours in the long-run.
In addition, the significance and the signs of the variables in the two models are largely the
same.
The most important coefficient in the model, 'P, is significant and positive for both
cohorts and regions indicating that deviations today from the weighted average of hours
worked in the past Ht bring disutility. The habit to work, therefore, exists for younger
and older women both in the East and the West. These results suggest that women in the
East who had to work full-time, or close to 40 hours per week, during communism after its
collapse continued to work full-time so that their hours are similar to a weighted average of
hours worked in the past. Women in the West, on the other hand, also work hours similar
to the ones worked in the past, but those hours were freely chosen to be full or part-time
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hours and therefore today they work full or part-time.
I also test whether the estimated parameters are the same between cohorts and regions
using a Chow test5 . The test shows that the parameters differ between cohorts for East
and West Germany and between regions for the younger and the older cohorts. The test,
however, does not indicate which coefficients differ across cohorts and regions and there
are no theoretical reasons that would lead me to believe that the coefficient <p should be
different between the East and the West.
The estimated impact of the weighted average of hours worked H t in the past on the
hours worked today H t is calculated at the sample means of the hourly wages and is reported
in columns 1 and 3 of Tables 1.2 and 1.3. These coefficients indicate a state dependence
between the hours worked today and the hours worked in the past.
The coefficient alk in the standard model is negative and significant for the younger and
older cohorts for the two regions. It indicates that increase in the stock of habits in the
utility function leads to increase in the marginal utility of hours worked. The significance
of alk by itself is not taken to be evidence for habits in the literature which uses this model.
Rather, the positive impact of the stock of hours K t on the hours worked today H t is
evidence for habits. This impact, reported in columns 2 and 4 in Tables 1.2 and 1.3, is
estimated at mean wages and is positive for all samples.
The marginal utility of consumption at zero level of consumption, (}c, is positive and
SIn comparing groups, we can use the F statistic to test whether there are any differences in effects across
groups. The F statistic is defined as:
F _ (SSEc - SSEu)(Nl + N2 - 2K - 2)
K+l,Nl+ N 2-2K-2 - SSEu(K + 1) ,
where S S Ec is the sum of squared errors from the constrained model, where one regression is estimated for
the two groups together, SSEu is the sum of squared errors from the two unconstrained models, where two
separate regressions are estimated for the two groups, N l and N 2 are the number of observations for the twogroups, and K is the number of parameters estimated.
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significant for the two cohorts in the East and the West German samples and its size
ranges from 0.009 to 0.012. The second derivative of the utility function with respect to
consumption, G ce , is negative and significant in all samples and is much smaller in magnitude
than G c • The signs and magnitudes of these two coefficients guarantee the concavity of the
utility function with respect to consumption with a positive first derivative and a negative
second derivative.
For the young and the old East German cohorts age is significant and negative indicating
that women in the East work less as their age increases.
The presence of children ages zero to six and seven to sixteen has no impact on the
number of hours that both younger and older women in the East work, but the increases in
the wage of the husband, for both younger and older married women, does lead to decrease
in the number of hours worked.
Older women in the East who are married work longer hours than do those who are
single. Further, older women in the East who have vocational degrees work longer hours
than do those who have basic education, while those with university degrees work shorter
hours than do those with basic education.
Among younger East German women, white collar workers work longer hours than
do blue collar workers. In addition, young East German women who work in the service
industry and the government work shorter hours, while those who work in agriculture work
longer hours.
In West Germany, as in East Germany, women in both cohorts work less as they age.
As might be expected, the presence of children decreases the hours worked in the West.
Having children younger than six is related to less hours worked for the younger Western
18
cohort, while the presence of children between the ages of seven and sixteen decreases the
hours worked both for the younger and the older women in the West.
University-educated young women in the West work more hours than do those with
basic education.
Young white collar workers in the West work longer hours than do young blue collar
workers, while older white collar workers in the West work shorter hours than do older blue
collar workers. In addition, working in the construction sector leads to less hours worked
among younger Western women.
The wage of the husband does not have an impact on the number of hours worked by
married women in the West and neither does the marital status of women. Unlike in the
East, where husband's wage matters for labor supply, in the West the presence of children
is more important for decreasing women's labor supply.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a model for habit formation in labor supply where the habit to work
is formed through working the same number of hours repeatedly and working different hours
brings disutility. This model is based on the notion in the psychology literature that habits
are formed through a repetition of a certain activity over time. In contrast to the standard
model in the literature, which predicts that there could be stable and unstable steady state
in the long-run with infinitely increasing or decreasing to zero hours at the unstable steady
state, my model predicts only a stable steady state in the long-run where one would work
hours similar to the hours worked in the past.
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Estimating the parameters of the structural labor supply equations derived from the
two models on data from East and West Germany from 1990 to 2000 indicates that the two
models fit the data equally well as measured by the R2 . More importantly, the parameter
which indicates that working today hours different from the hours worked in the past brings
disutility is significant for the East and the West German samples and has the expected
positive sign. This finding suggests that there are habits with respect to labor supply in
East and West Germany, where the habit to work is expressed by working today hours
similar to a weighted average of hours worked in the past.
These results have interesting implications for the observed differences in labor supply
in the East and West German territories after unification. Women in the East who did not
have a choice but to work full-time during communism, now when the ideological pressure to
work is gone, continued to work predominantly full-time. In the West, on the other hand,
women were always free to choose their labor supply and worked full-time or part-time.
The findings in my model suggest that women in the East continue to work full-time today
because they work hours close to the hours worked in the past, which were fixed to full-time
by the communist regime. Women in the West also work hours similar to the ones worked
in the past, but those hours were freely chosen to be full or part-time hours. My model,
therefore, provides insight into the labor supply behavior of East and West German women
today-something that the traditional model of labor supply cannot accomplish.
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Table 1.1: Summary statistics of East and West German women, younger than 46 at unifi-
cation
West Germany 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Hours worked 33 33 32 32 31 31 30 30 30 29 29
Wife's real hourly wage 22.52 19.33 20.38 21.11 21.45 22.38 23.28 21.53 22.62 22.6 21.9
Husband's real hourly wage 25.83 25.04 27.7 27.91 30.42 29.26 29.46 29.55 28.64 30.47 29.87
Owning a home 0.4 0.39 0.41 0.4 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.49 0.5
Age 34 33 34 36 37 38 39 39 41 41 42
Dummy for children (0-6) 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.1 0.09
Dummy for children (7-16) 0.3 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.33 0.36 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.4 0.39
Vocational training 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.77 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.74 0.76 0.83
University degree 0.1 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.11 0.11 0.13
Married 0.61 0.59 0.61 0.65 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68
Working in agriculture 0 0 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0
Working in mining & utilities 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0
Working in construction 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.03
Working in manufacturing 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.18
Working in trade & transport 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06
Working in services 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.4 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.44 0.44
Working in government 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.1 0.1 0.09
H 31 28 29 30 30 30 29 30 30 29 29
K 62 56 58 60 60 60 59 59 59 58 58
East Germany 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Hours worked 42 39 40 40 40 40 40 40 39 39 39
Wife's real hourly wage 7.99 11.48 13.53 15.72 16.22 17.21 17.15 18.03 18.39 19.58 18.82
Husband's hourly gross wage 9.54 15.27 15.85 16.64 17.97 17.04 18.19 18.91 19.08 20.27 19.24
Owning a home 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.46
Age 34 35 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43
Dummy for children (0-6) 0.35 0.34 0.28 0.25 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
Dummy for children (7-16) 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.59 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.46
Vocational training 0.74 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.89
University degree 0.36 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.47
Married 0.79 0.81 0.8 0.83 0.82 0.8 0.79 0.77 0.78 0.76 0.77
Working in agriculture 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03
Working in mining & utilities 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03
Working in construction 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03
Working in manufacturing 0.27 0.2 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13
Working in trade & transport 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05
Working in services 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.41
Working in government 0.09 0.17 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17
H 39 40 40 39 40 40 40 40 40 39 39
K 79 80 79 79 80 80 80 80 80 79 79
Note: wages are measured in 1995 German Marks. Husbands' wages are calculated only for the employed.
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Table 1.2: Structural estimation of current and standard models for East Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
East Germany East Germany East Germany East Germany
(35 or younger (35 or younger (older than 35 (older than 35
at unification) at unification) at unification) at unification)
-current model -standard model -current model -standard model
<p 0.148 0.490
(2.00)** (2.86)***
alk -0.066 -0.164
(2.36)** (4.27)***
ac 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.008
(4.78)*** (4.82)*** (3.86)*** (4.18)***
ace -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(3.30)*** (3.56)*** (2.29)** (2.66)***
Occupation 2.910 2.520 -0.507 -0.346
(2.68)*** (2.69)*** (0.36) (0.37)
Age -0.782 -0.686 -1.098 -0.741
(5.29)*** (6.65)*** (3.98)*** (5.96)***
Dummy for children (0-6) 0.029 -0.002 -0.051 -0.053
(0.03) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03)
Dummy for children (7-16) 0.447 0.381 -1.952 -1.326
(0.43) (0.42) (1.29) (1.38)
Dummy for having a voca- 1.098 0.903 6.211 4.149
tional degree
(0.50) (0.47) (1.83)* (1.81)*
Dummy for having a uni- -1.404 -1.259 -7.994 -5.390
versity degree
(0.54) (0.56) (1.65)* (1.74)*
Husband's wage*Dummy -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
for being married
(4.41)*** (4.51)*** (3.41)*** (3.77)***
Dummy for being married 2.526 2.164 12.501 8.336
(1.29) (1.26) (3.19)*** (3.35)***
Dummy for working in agri- 5.077 4.402 3.595 2.395
culture
(2.22)** (2.23)** (1.06) (1.06)
Dummy for working in min- -5.678 -4.938 8.548 5.713
ing & utilities
(1.05) (1.06) (1.55) (1.58)
Dummy for working in con- -5.406 -4.708 2.004 1.332
struction
(1.14) (1.15) (0.47) (0.47)
Dummy for working in 1.778 1.536 0.229 0.139
manufacturing
(1.24) (1.24) (0.10) (0.09)
Dummy for working in 1.996 1.723 1.489 0.986
trade & transport
(0.96) (0.95) (0.42) (0.41)
Dummy for working in ser- -4.118 -3.596 -0.891 -0.609
vices
(2.45)** (2.54)** (0.41) (0.42)
Dummy for working in gov- -3.974 -3.474 -2.612 -1.760
ernment
(2.10)** (2.17)** (0.92) (0.94)
Total effect ofH on hours 0.129 0.329
Total effect of K on hours 0.066 0.164
Observations 2184 2184 1325 1325
Adjusted R 2 0.137 0.1371 0.1214 0.1214
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.3: Structural estimation of current and standard models for West Germany
(1) (2) (3) (4)
West Germany West Germany West Germany West Germany
(35 or younger (35 or younger (older than 35 (older than 35
at unification) at unification) at unification) at unification)
-current model -standard model -current model -standard model
'P 0.135 0.265
(4.47)*** (5.34)***
alk -0.059 -0.105
(5.07)*** (6.76)***
ac 0.013 0.011 0.009 0.007
(20.40)*** (24.10)*** (10.58)*** (11.45)***
ace -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(10.44)*** (10.77)** (4.37)*** (4.50)***
Occupation 1.200 1.057 -1.539 -1.216
(2.36)** (2.36)** (2.21)** (2.19)**
Age -0.601 -0.529 -0.190 -0.150
(9.44)*** (10.05)*** (2.46)** (2.50)**
Dummy for children (0-6) -1.589 -1.398 1.121 0.886
(3.18)*** (3.18)*** (0.75) (0.75)
Dummy for children (7-16) -1.140 -1.005 -1.546 -1.223
(2.11)** (2.09)** (2.03)** (2.02)**
Dummy for having a voca- -1.612 -1.420 0.734 0.580
tional degree
(1.10) (1.10) (0.38) (0.38)
Dummy for having a uni- 5.387 4.739 -10.399 -8.222
versity degree
(2.93)*** (2.94)*** (1.10) (1.11)
Husband's wage*Dummy -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
for being married
(1.20) (1.20) (0.17) (0.17)
Dummy for being married -1.533 -1.349 -0.713 -0.563
(1.38) (1.38) (0.46) (0.46)
Dummy for working in agri- -3.502 -3.080 1.080 0.854
culture
(1.05) (1.05) (0.34) (0.34)
Dummy for working in min- -4.533 -3.987 5.405 4.270
ing & utilities
(1.35) (1.35) (0.86) (0.86)
Dummy for working in con- -3.123 -2.751 0.139 0.110
struction
(1.87)* (1.86)* (0.08) (0.08)
Dummy for working in 0.305 0.268 -0.215 -0.171
manufacturing
(0.36) (0.36) (0.20) (0.20)
Dummy for working in 1.331 1.171 1.106 0.874
trade & transport
(1.22) (1.22) (0.77) (0.77)
Dummy for working in ser- 0.277 0.244 1.391 1.099
vices
(0.35) (0.35) (1.38) (1.38)
Dummy for working in gov- -0.588 -0.518 1.888 1.493
ernment
(0.44) (0.44) (1.13) (1.13)
Total effect of Ii on hours 0.119 0.209
Total effect of K on hours 0.059 0.105
Observations 2878 2878 1691 1691
Adjusted R 2 0.4285 0.4285 0.2153 0.2153
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Figure 1.1: Hours worked per week-East and West Germany
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Figure 1.4: Stable steady state
Figure 1.5: Unstable steady state
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Chapter 2
Ratioinal Model for Habit
Formation in Labor Supply-A New
Look
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, I develop a rational model for habit formation in labor supply where the
habit to work is formed through working the same number of hours over time and where
deviations from a weighted average of hours worked in the past bring disutilityl. This model
is based on a theory of habits in the psychology literature, where habits are defined as an
individually acquired behavior pattern that had become" stereotyped through repetition" ,
Morgan, (1973, p.383).
The current study is in contrast to the Becker and Murphy's (1988) rational addiction
model adopted in the labor supply literature, in which habits exist when increase in the
hours worked in the past leads to increase in the hours worked today. This assumption is
reflected through the time-inseparability of hours worked today and the stock of hours in
the utility function. As a result, the standard model predicts the existence of stable and
1Individuals are rational when they take into account the feedback of their present decisions on their
future preferences and maximize a utility function over their lifetime.
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unstable steady states in the long-run where an unstable steady state is characterized with
infinitely increasing or decreasing to zero hours over time. Unlike addictions, however, labor
supply cannot usually be explained with infinitely increasing or decreasing to zero hours
of work over time. The current model differs from the standard habit formation models in
the literature in its prediction that in the long-run there is only a stable steady state where
hours worked today converge to an average of hours worked in the past.
The model developed in this paper can be extended beyond the labor supply framework
to explain other types of repetitive activities in the daily life domain such as exercising on
a regular basis.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model and its solution, Section
3 compares the predictions of the model to the ones of the standard model in the literature
and Section 4 concludes.
2.2 The model
Below I describe the model and its solution close to a steady state, following the Becker
and Murphy's (1988) approach. I derive the conditions necessary for a long-run stability
of the steady state and observe that there is always a stable steady state regardless of the
parameter values in the model.
Let an agent maximize a utility function with a constant rate of time preference a and
a number of periods during which the agent has worked t:
(2.1)
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(2.3)
I assume the utility function is quadratic in consumption, Ot, in leisure Lt and in deviations
of the hours worked today H t from a weighted average of hours worked in all prior periods
H t and has the following form:
where Uz > 0, U e > 0, Uu == au < 0, U ee == ace < 0. The average hours worked in the past H t
is defined as an exponentially weighted average of hours that each individual has worked
in the past where more importance is placed on more recent hours by discounting hours
worked in the past in an exponential manner and where 6 is the depreciation rate of habits,
o< 6 ::; 1:
t
Ht == 62:(1 - 6)j Ht-l-j == 6Ht-l + (1 - 6)Ht - 1 .
j=O
The parameter 'P is positive and indicates that deviations of the hours worked today
from the average hours worked in the past, H t - H t , bring disutility.
The agent maximizes the utility function subject to the budget constraints:
(2.4)
(2.5)
and
and to the tranversality condition
lim e-atH(t) == 0,
t~oo
(2.6)
(2.7)
where T is the time in the day devoted to work and leisure which we assume to be equal
to one. We also assume that the agent has an infinite working life, t == 00, that Pt == 1, and
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that the rate of time preference is equal to the rate of interest, a == r. Since this is a rational
habit formation model, the time preference for the present a is relatively small. If the time
preference for the present a increases, the individual becomes more and more myopic. In
the extreme case when the time preference goes to infinity, the individual is fully myopic
and maximizes only today's utility function2•
Further, for tractability the wage Wt is assumed to be constant.
The Hamiltonian then becomes:
1 2 - 1 - 2 1 -2H == QcCt + 2QccCt + Qz(T - Ht) + 2 Qll (T - Ht ) - 2'P(Ht - Ht ) +
+ J.L(rAt + wHt - PtCt) + 'TJ(8Ht - 8Ht ), (2.8)
where J.L is the marginal utility of income and 'TJ is the marginal utility of the average hours
worked in the past Ht. The first order conditions with respect to Ct, Ht , At, and Ht are:
(2.9)
(2.10)
(2.11)
and
(2.12)
2In a rational habit formation model an agent maximizes a utility function with a constant rate of time
preference a and a number of periods during which the agent has worked t:
If the time preference for the present a goes to infinity, then the utility fnction is maximized only over one
period and the model become a myopic model of habit formation:
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Using the first order conditions together with equation (2.4) for the stock of hours and its
first time derivative:
00
o H t -=---
H t == T +Ht ,
a differential equation for Ht is obtained:
where
B - -all<5(<5 + a) 0- > ,
cp - all
and
z == <5(6 + a)(az + all - JLw) .
cp - all
(2.13)
(2.14)
(2.15)
(2.16)
Using the initial conditions of H(O) == Ho and H(oo) == H*, where H* is the long-run
steady state value of H, together with the general solution of the differential equation
H (t) == meA1t + H*, where m == H 0 - H*, we obtain a solution of the form:
The roots of the differential equation (2.14) Al and A2 are equal to:
A _ (f ± ..j(f2 + 4B
1,2 - 2 '
(2.17)
(2.18)
where Al is the smaller root. The larger root A2 of the differential equation violates the
transversality condition (2.7). Differentiating equation (2.17) with respect to time t, and
substituting the result in equation (2.4), we obtain that:
(2.19)
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Habits exist when ~ > 0, or when there is a positive relation between the labor supply
in the past and the current labor supply. That condition is fulfilled whenever ).,1:8 > 0,
which is equivalent to '1'8(8 + u) > 0, and the last inequality is always true because '1' > 0
and 8(8 + u) > o.
For a constant At == A, a long-run equilibrium solution H* == H* to the model is
obtained by substituting H t == H t+l - H t == 0 in equation (2.4). The labor supply will
move to such an equilibrium only when it is locally stable and the condition for stability
of the steady state is ~;:~:~ = >'1:6 < 13. This happens if and only if Ai < O. Going back
to the definition of Al in equation (2.18), it can be seen that Al is negative whenever B is
positive and B, as defined in equation (2.15), is always positive as '1' - all> 0 and all < O.
It follows then, that there is always a stable steady state in the long-run and the hours
worked H will always converge to the average hours worked in the past H*.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the long-run equilibrium of the model. Stable steady state is
reached when the slope of the labor supply equation (2.19) is smaller than the slope of the
steady state line H* == H*.
It should be noted that rationality, or small 0", is not a necessary condition for the
existence of habits nor for the existence of stable steady state. The model would have kept
its properties even if a person were fully myopic, 0" ~ 00.
3The condition for asypmtotically stable equilibrium states that if Yo is a rest point of the differential
equation iJ == I(y) where I(yo) == 0, then yo is an asymptotically stable equilibrium if I' (yo) < o. Applied
I -* 8H*(t) 8H*(t)
to our problem, I (H ) = 81l*(t) - 1 < 0 or 81l*(t) < 1 needs to be true for stability of the steady state.
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2.3 Comparison to the existing model
The standard model in the literature is solved in a similar manner. The utility function in
that model is of the form:
(2.20)
where Uz > 0, Uc > 0, Uu = au < 0, Ucc = ace < 0, Ulk = alk < 0, and K t is the habit stock.
The habit stock is equal to:
t
K t = L(l -lS)jHt-l-j = Ht-l + (1 - <5)Kt-l'
j=O
(2.21)
where °S <5 S 1 is the rate of depreciation of the habit stock. The utility function
is maximized subject to the budget constraints in equations (2.4), (2.5) and (5) and a
differential equation in K is obtained:
where
B' = -alk(2lS + a) + 8(8 + a)au
all
and
z' = aZk + (8 + a) (-az - au + /Lw) ,
au
The solution to the differential equation is:
H(t) = K(t)(A~ + <5) - A~K*,
(2.22)
(2.23)
(2.24)
(2.25)
where K* is the steady state value of K and A~ is the smaller root of the differential equation
(2.22).
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Habits exist when g~~ > 0, or when there is a positive relation between the labor supply
in the past and the current labor supply. That condition is fulfilled whenever (a+28)alk < 0,
which is always true. In this model, therefore, it is also not necessary that a person be
rational, or the value of a be very small, for habits to exist.
For a constant Wt == wand At == A, a long-run equilibrium solution H* == K* to the
model is obtained by substituting K t == K t+l - K t == 0 in equation (2.21). The labor
supply will move to such an equilibrium only when it is locally stable and the condition for
stability of the steady state is that the slope of the equilibrium line H* == 8K* exceeds the
slope of the labor supply equation(2.25), or when 8 > A~ + 8. This happens if and only if
A~ < 0 which is true whenever B' is positive. B', however, is not always positive because
-alk(28 + a) > 0 and 8(8 + a)all < 0 and thus there could be stable and unstable steady
states where a person can work ever increasing or decreasing to zero hours.
The unstable steady state is shown in Figure 2.2, where the slope of the equilibrium line
H* == 8K* is smaller than the slope of the labor supply equation (2.25).
2.4 Conclusion
This paper presents a theoretical model of rational habit formation in labor supply, where
habits are formed through a repetition of a certain activity over time. In the model, then,
the habit to work is developed through working the same number of hours over and over
again and deviations from those hours bring disutility. The idea that habits are formed
through a repetition of an activity over time is borrowed from the psychology literature and
is for the first time introduced to the labor supply literature.
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I describe the solution of this model and the standard model in the literature near steady
state and I show that labor supply in my model always converges to a stable steady state
value of a weighted average of hours worked in the past. In the standard model, on the
other hand, there is a possibility of unstable steady state where hours increase to infinity
or decrease down to zero. As such labor supply behavior is not typically observed in labor
supply data, I argue that the model presented here provides a better theoretical explanation
for habits in a labor supply framework than does the standard model in the literature.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Private Long-Term
Care Insurance Benefits on
Selected Medicare Services1
3.1 Introduction
Does private long-term care insurance affect the probability of accessing Medicare covered
home health aide, skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility and inpatient hospital ser-
vices, the utilization of these services (i.e. number of visits or days), and the expenditures
for them2? While the impact of the growth in the long-term care insurance market on
Medicaid's expenditures and financing has been studies by Frakt and Pizer (2001), there
are no studies examining the impact of private long-term care insurance on the utilization
of Medicare covered acute and post-acute care services. This paper is a first attempt to
investigate the impact of long-term care insurance on the use of Medicare covered acute
and post-acute services by linking Medicare services utilization data to socia-demographic
IThis paper is coauthored with Marc Cohen and Jessica Miller
2Long-term care refers to a broad array of services provided at home, in the community or in facilities to
people who need help with everyday activities such as meal preparation or cleaning, or help with fundamental
activities such as bathing, dressing or eating. Therapeutic care for the treatment or management of chronic
conditions is also considered long-term care although the vast majority of long-term care services users are
elderly people with physical or mental limitations.
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and health data on privately insured elders who claim benefits under their policies and
non-insured Medicare beneficiaries.
Since the introduction of private long-term care insurance, policy makers have hypothe-
sized that with respect to home care services the utilization of the publicly financed Medicare
and Medicaid would decline. This has been an expectation because private insurance is a
much better alternative than Medicare: it covers both skilled and unskilled home care ser-
vices while Medicare covers only skilled care, and private insurance covers care for much
longer period of time than does Medicare. What has been overlooked, however, in the
formation of these expectations is that the use of private insurance does not preclude the
use of Medicare. Those who have private insurance could be using the insurance to pay
for less skilled services at home and simultaneously be using Medicare to pay for more
skilled services in order to preserve the benefits under their insurance for a longer period of
time. These expectations are valid both for people who have private insurance and are at
the point of deciding whether the insurance or Medicare should pay for their care, and for
people who are currently using their insurance. In this paper, we investigate whether the
expected decrease in the use of Medicare covered long-term care services is indeed occurring
among elders who use their long-term care insurance to pay for service utilization at home.
In addition to the home care services, Medicare also covers care provided in a nursing
home for up to one hundred days and acute care provided in a hospital. Private insur-
ance and Medicare are not substitutes with respect to these services since long-term care
insurance does not cover these types of services at all. We study the impact of long-term
care insurance on the utilization of Medicare covered skilled nursing facility and inpatient
hospital services to see whether the care that people receive under their private insurance
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at home might help prevent episodes of acute care needed in a facility or hospital.
Understanding the relationship between private long-term care insurance and utilization
of the Medicare covered long-term care services is important from a policy perspective, as
the ageing of the baby boom generation is expected to lead to a substantial increase in the
demand for long-term care. Medicare, after Medicaid, is the second largest public payer for
long-term care services for the elderly and it is important to understand whether people
who pay privately for their long-term care use more or less of the publicly financed Medicare
services. This paper studies whether people who already use their long-term care insurance
to pay for services use more or less of the Medicare covered services. Since around fifty
percent of the people who buy insurance end up using it, our results can help us draw
some conclusions about the larger population of long-term care insurance purchasers. Even
though our results apply only to people who are using their private insurance, this study is
an important first step in understanding the impact of insurance on use of Medicare covered
services.
When estimating the effect of private long-term care insurance on the probability of
using Medicare covered home health aide, skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility,
and inpatient hospital services, we pay a particular attention to the issue of selection bias.
People who have and use long-term care insurance are not a randomly selected group of
people and it is possible that there are unobservable characteristics which are related to
the probability of having private insurance as well as to the propensity to use Medicare
services. Such unobservables could be related to one's health. We use the presence of
children living within 25 miles as an instrument for having long-term care insurance and
argue that whether or not someone has children who live close by is not related to one's
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health condition and, therefore, to the probability of accessing Medicare covered acute or
post-acute services.
The most important results of the study indicate that disabled elders who have and use
long-term care insurance are less likely to access the Medicare covered home health aide
services than are the non-insured, and have fewer visits and lower expenditures for those
services per year than do the non-insured. These findings support the proposition that
individuals who use private long-term care insurance have a different pattern of service use of
the publicly financed long-term care expenditures. Since roughly half of those who purchase
long-term care insurance use it in the future, we can conclude that as more individuals
purchase private long-term care insurance, the use of and expenditures on selected Medicare
covered long-term care services should decline.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Literature review
The literature examining the relationship between private long-term care insurance and the
utilization of Medicare covered long-term care services consists mainly of descriptive studies
which examine utilization of Medicare covered long-term care services separately for insured
and non-insured elders.
Using data on disabled elders who have long-term care insurance and are receiving
benefits under their policies, Cohen, Miller and Weinrobe (2000) find that ninety-three
percent of community dwelling claimants were not receiving Medicare financed home health
aide visits or skilled nursing home visits in the week prior to being interviewed. Jackson
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and Doty (1999), on the other hand, use data from the 1994 NLTCS, and show that thirty
percent of non-privately insured disabled elders self-reported using Medicare as a payment
source for home care services. Based on these self-reports, one may conclude that Medicare
is not a particularly important home care payment source for the privately insured.
First, however, these studies have important limitations as they do not control for
other observable characteristics that might be important determinants of the utilization of
Medicare covered services and thus do not isolate the impact of private insurance on the
use of those services. Second, these studies rely on self-reported data of Medicare services
utilization, which may differ from the actual service utilization. The only way to determine
precisely how much the insured as well as the non-insured use Medicare services and whether
having long-term care insurance affects the use of acute and post-acute Medicare services,
is to link actual data on Medicare service utilization and costs to socia-demographic and
health data on insured and non-insured disabled elders.
3.2.2 Long-term care financing
The current long-term care financing system, most of which is comprised of the Federal
government's financing of long-term care services through the Medicare and the Medicaid
programs, will be under tremendous strain as the baby boomer generation begins to retire.
The first baby boomers will begin to reach age 65 in 2011 and the percentage of elderly in
the general population will rise from 13 percent in 1995 to 20 percent in 2040. This increase
in the elderly population will lead to an increase in expenditures for long-term care. These
expenditures are projected to grow by 2.6 percent per year between 2000 and 2040 and
reach $207 billion in 2020 and $346 billion in 2040, Congressional Budget Office (1999).
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In recent years a number of proposals designed to encourage individuals to take personal
responsibility for paying for care have dominated the policy arena. More specifically, public
policies designed to encourage the purchase of private long-term care insurance have been
adopted at the state and federal level. An example is the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPPA) of 1996. Under HIPPA, the tax advantages associated with the
purchase of accident and health insurance were extended to long-term care insurance. This
meant that individuals who itemized deductions and whose total medical expense, including
qualified long-term care insurance premiums, exceeded 7.5 percent of their adjusted gross
income, could deduct qualified long-term care insurance premiums from their gross income.
In addition, HIPPA stipulated that benefits received under qualified long-term care policies
could be deducted from taxable income and that employer contributions to purchase of
long-term care insurance would also be deductible as a business expense. The Federal
government is currently sponsoring a long-term care insurance program with an abbreviated
underwriting process to benefit its presently working and retired employees.
Encouraging the purchase of long-term care insurance has also been happening at the
state level. Half of the states have enacted legislation to stimulate the expansion of the
market for long-term care insurance. As of the late 1990s, 19 states had put into place tax
incentives to encourage the purchase of long-term care insurance and 21 states had enacted
laws that make private long-term care benefits an option for state employees. A few states,
among which Maryland, Oregon and Maine are providing small tax incentives to employers
who contribute to the cost of group long-term care insurance plan for their employees.
Although Medicaid traditionally pays for the long-term care expenses incurred by the
elderly, and proposals encouraging the purchase of long-term care insurance have evalu-
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ated mainly the potential benefits to the Medicaid program, long-term care insurance may
also have an impact on Medicare spending. Medicare beneficiaries receive post-acute care
through the program's skilled nursing facility and home health care benefits and the pro-
gram is now the largest payer for home health care services which meet post-acute as well as
chronic care needs. Long-term care needs are also covered under long-term care insurance
policies and it is important to asses the impact of private long-term care insurance on the
utilization and expenditures of Medicare services.
3.2.3 Conceptual link between long-term care insurance and Medicare
utilization
As we already mentioned, Medicare and long-term insurance can be imperfect substitutes
with respect to home care coverage. Medicare covers home health services that are deemed
to be medically necessary and are provided by a physician or a skilled medical personnel
under the supervision of a physician, while private insurance covers skilled care services as
well as a broader range of services provided at home that do not have to be proven to be
medically necessary. Further, Medicare covers services only when a person is homebound.
In light of the broader coverage of services and less strict eligibility criteria under private
insurance, it has been hypothesized that privately insured will use their insurance rather
than Medicare to pay for care at home. This might have been the correct intuition if
Medicare and long-term care insurance cannot be used at the same time. It is possible,
however, that insured individuals use Medicare to pay for more skilled services and use
their polices to pay for less skilled services. In this way, the insured preserve their insurance
pool of dollars to last longer. For example, if an insured has a policy which covers care
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at home for $150,000 with a daily benefit amount for $150 for 1,000 days, and the insured
spends less per day for care at home, he or she will have benefits for more than 1,000 days.
Facility based care is covered by Medicare but is not covered under long-term care
insurance. Medicare covers skilled nursing facility care for a limited time period but long-
term care insurance does not cover such care due to elimination period restrictions3 . Acute
hospital care is also covered by Medicare but not by long-term care insurance. It is possible,
that those who receive long-term care services under their insurance are less likely to need
Medicare covered facility based services as the care they already receive at home could help
prevent episodes of acute care needed in a facility.
3.2.4 An ideal experiment which measures the link between long-term
care and Medicare utilization
Long-term care insurance is not purchased and used randomly by the population. People
who have long-term care insurance are people who are more likely to need and use services
for health reasons, and thus they might be more likely to use Medicare covered services. To
capture the impact of insurance on Medicare services utilization in an ideal experiment, we
need to have two identical with respect to health and demographic characteristics groups
of people and ask the people in one group to buy and use private insurance while leave
the people in the other group without insurance. Then, we can determine the impact of
private insurance on Medicare services utilization. Since, however, we do not have an ideal
experiment scenario, we need to use instruments to control for the non-random distribution
of long-term care insurance ownership and use in the population, as we discuss in section 4.
3Elimination period is the period of time between the onset of a disability and the time the policyholder
is eligible for benefits.
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3.3 Data
We combine three data sets for this analysis. Socio-demographic and health data on pri-
vately insured community dwelling disabled individuals who were receiving benefits under
their long-term care insuranc~policies were collected between 1997 and 1999. Contact infor-
mation on eligible claimants4 , who were living in the community and were receiving benefits
under their long-term care insurance policies were provided by eight of the major long-term
care insurance companies in the country to LifePlans5 • These claimants were interviewed
in their homes by nurses experts in the geriatric field and data on their socio-demographic
and health status were collected. In total 697 privately insured claimants participated in
the study. Medicare claims history data provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services were linked to each individual in the privately insured sample for the year of the
in-person interview. The final insured sample is comprised of 541 individuals who have
complete data records for Medicare services utilization and were 65 or older at the time of
the interview.
Comparable data for non-privately insured disabled community dwelling individuals
were obtained from the 1994 wave of the National Long-Term Care Survey, (NLTCS),
a longitudinal study of the health and well-being of Medicare beneficiaries 65 and older
conducted by the Center for Demographic Studies at Duke University and sponsored by
4Disabled elders in this study are considered to be people who have limitations in two or more of the six
Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) which are eating, bathing, dressing, transferring, toileting and continence,
or are diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease or other related cognitive disorder, or have failed a mental status
questionnaire commonly used to assess the mental condition of the elderly. The mental status questionnaire
is called The Short Portable Mental Status Questionnaire and it includes questions about today's date, who
the current president of the U.S. is, what the maiden name of the person's mother is and the like. There
are 10 questions in the questionnaire and answering 4 or more incorrectly is considered failing the test.
5The eight insurance companies are Aegon, American Travellers, Bankers Life and Casualty, Fortis Long-
Term Care, G.E. Capital Assurance, John Hancock, UNUM and CNA Insurance.
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the National Institute on Ageing6 . The questions in the NLTCS were meant to identify
persons living in the community or in nursing homes who had certain disabilities or health
problems lasting three months or longer. The total 1994 NLTCS sample consisted of 4,167
individuals but only 1,331 of them had completed the comprehensive community survey,
had complete data records for Medicare services utilization and were 65 or older in the year
of the interview. To account for the difference in interview dates, we adjust expenditure
data to 1998 dollars. The adjustment is based on the medical component of the consumer
price index, which increased on average roughly by 3 percent per year during the period.
These two data sets were linked via social security number to Medicare claims data
provided by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The Medicare claims data
contain information on home health aide visits and expenditures, on skilled nursing home
visits and expenditures, on skilled nursing facility visits and expenditures and on the number
of days spent as an inpatient in hospitals and the associated expenditures for all the years
between 1992 and 2000. By linking the Medicare claims data for the corresponding year to
socio-demographic and health data on disabled privately insured individuals and similarly
disabled non-insured individuals, we are able to compare the acute or post-acute care service
utilization of individuals with long-term care insurance to the acute or post-acute care
services utilization of individuals without private insurance.
Table 3.1 summarizes the use of the Medicare covered services and the number of visits
and expenditures for those who have used the services by insurance status of the individual.
With respect to the home based services-home health aide and skilled nursing home visits,
the privately insured are less likely than the non-insured to use home health aide visits
6The study was first conducted in 1982, then again in 1984 and then every five years thereafter. Data
from the 1999 NLTCS were not available at the time of this study.
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and are as likely as the non-insured to use skilled nursing home visits. The insured have
also used less home health aide and skilled nursing home visits per year and have lower
expenditures for those services than do the non-insured.
With respect to facility based services-skilled nursing facility and inpatient hospital
services, lower percentage of insured elders have used inpatient hospital services and similar
percentages of insured and non-insured elders have used skilled nursing facility services.
There is no difference between the number of visits and expenditures for facility based
services between insured and non-insured.
As shown in Table 3.2, there are also important demographic and health differences
between the two groups. The privately insured are younger, are more likely to be white,
more likely to own a home and less likely to have children living nearby. The privately
insured also tend to have more limitations in Activities of Daily Living (ADLs) and a
higher incidence of Alzheimer's disease and stroke, whereas disabled elders without private
insurance tend to be more likely to have diabetes, cancer and respiratory problems.
In the section that follows, we control for these characteristics to determine whether
insurance status can explain differences in patterns of service utilization between the two
groups.
3.4 Estimation
3.4.1 Probability of using Medicare covered services
We estimate the effect of having and using private long-term care insurance on the prob-
ability of using Medicare covered home health aide, skilled nursing home, skilled nursing
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facility, and inpatient hospital services and we pay a particular attention to the issue of
selection bias.
Individuals who use long-term care insurance are not a random sample of the popula-
tion. Those are people who are more likely to need and use services for health reasons.
There are, therefore, unobservables which reflect that tendency and which are correlated
with whether or not someone has long-term care insurance. More formally, the variable
indicating the presence of long-term care insurance is correlated with Medicare utilization,
or is endogenous, and if endogeneity is not corrected for the results could be biased. The
appropriate model, therefore, must take endogeneity into account and below we outline a
bivariate probit model that does that.
Lets supposes that the net benefits of using Medicare services can be written as:
yr == (3XI + "'/Y2 + cI, YI == 1 if yi > 0, 0 otherwise,
and the benefit of having and using long-term care insurance can be written as:
Y2 == QX2 + C2, Y2 == 1 if Y2 > 0, °otherwise,
(3.1)
(3.2)
where an individual will use Medicare covered long-term care services, Yl = 1, and will
have long-term care insurance, Y2 = 1, if the net benefits are positive i.e. yi > 0 and
Y2 > 0, and where Xl and X2 are vectors of observables. We allow for the possibility
that the unobservable determinants of using Medicare services, €l, and of having long-term
care insurance, C2, are correlated, COV(cI,c2) == PI, by assuming that the error terms have
bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and variance one. Because both decisions
that we model are dichotomous, there are four possible states of the world (Yl = 1 or 0 and
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Y2 == 1 or 0) and the likelihood function corresponding to this set of events is a bivariate
probit as noted by Wooldridge (2002) and described in the Appendix.
One identifying exogenous restriction is the presence of children living within 25 miles
of the residence of the elderly person which affects the decision of whether to buy long-term
care insurance but does not affect Medicare utilization. For the instrument to be valid,
presence of children living nearby needs to be correlated with long-term care insurance
ownership and needs to be uncorrelated with Medicare utilization. There is ample evidence
in the literature that people who have children living nearby are less likely to buy long-term
care insurance, Cohen, Kumar and Wallack (1992), as children are potential caregivers. We
also provide evidence for that relationship in the data we use by estimating a probit model
for having insurance where having children living close by is one of the regressors. The
results are reported in Table 3.3 and they indicate those who have children living within 25
miles are less likely to have long-term care insurance.
The credibility of our instrument then, hinges on the assumption that presence of chil-
dren living close by is not correlated with Medicare utilization. This assumes that having
children who live close by is not related to whether or not someone needs skilled medical
care that is covered under Medicare, as Medicare covers only care provided by a physician
or by a skilled medical professional under the supervision of a physician. While it is possi-
ble that children who live close by can provide unskilled help to their parents, it is highly
unlikely that they can provide highly skilled medical services to them so as to reduce the
need for Medicare covered services7.
7It might, however, be possible that children moved close to their parent because their parents needed to
used Medicare. In this case, there could be a correlation between the instrument and Medicare utilization
but given the data that we have available, we cannot control for the time when children started living close
to their parents.
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The regressors included in Xl are age, race, gender, home ownership, measures of phys-
ical and cognitive impairment, and diagnosis of diabetes, cancer, stroke, heat attack and
respiratory problems, while the regressors in X2 are the same as those included in Xl plus
the instrument for long-term care insurance ownership.
The results from the bivariate probit estimation are presented in Tables 3.4 through 3.7,
where to measure the quantitative importance of the presence of long-term care insurance,
we report the marginal effects8 and standard errors9 of that variable. We also present a
probit estimations of equation (3.1) where the identifying assumption is that insurance is
exogenous. When we compare the marginal effects and significance of insurance in both
types of estimation, we see that there is a negative and significant relationship between
insurance and use of home health aide services and that insurance is not significant in
determining use of skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility or inpatient hospital services
with or without the presence of endogeneity. Further, marginal effects show that the size
of the impact of insurance on use of home health aide services is larger when we control for
endogeneity than it is under the assumption that insurance is exogenous.
8Following Greene (1998), the marginal effect of the endogenous binary variable Y2:
E[Yllxl,X2,Y2 == 1] - E[Yllxl,X2,Y2 == 0] == ep({3'Xl + ,) - ep({3'Xl),
where q> (.) is the cdf.
9Standard errors in all cases are computed using the delta method, which again is described in Greene
(1998). Using Greene's notation, if 8k is the marginal effect computed using the parameter estimates and
some configuration of the data, Vb is the estimated covariance matrix of the estimates in the first probit
equation, and Va is the estimated covariance matrix of the estimates in the second probit equation, then the
asymptotic variance for the estimated marginal effect is:
Var. 8k == Do{3VbDo~ + Don VaDo~,
where
and
Don == 88k ({3, Q", datat)j8(Q').
In all of our bivariate probit estimations, standard errors are computed in the described above way since
the correlation between the error terms of the two probit equations p is equal to o. If p is not 0, then the
two terms of the variance are combined into a single vector and a single assypmtotic covariance matrix. The
square root of the variance gives the standard error.
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3.4.2 Amount and expenditures for Medicare covered services
We are also interested in the impact of private long-term care insurance on the quantity
and expenditures for home health aide, skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility and
inpatient hospital services. We estimate the models with a tobit analysis since some people
did not use Medicare covered services and have no expenditures for them, while others
used the services and have positive number of visits and expenditures. The model has the
following form:
Y3 = (}X3 + TJY2 + C3, Y3 = Y3 if Y3 > 0, and Y3 = °otherwise, (3.3)
where an individual will have a positive number of visits and expenditures if there is a
positive net benefit, Y3 > 0, and will have no visits and expenditures if there is a negative
net benefit, Y3 < 0, and where Y2 is a dummy for the presence of long-term care insurance
and X3 are observables.
Because the presence of endogeneity did not have an impact on the significance and size
of the variable of interest, insurance, in the probit model, we expect that accounting for
endogeneity in the tobit model will not change the results. We leave up to the reader to
decide whether or not the believe the results of our tobit estimation.
The regressors included in X3 are age, race, gender, home ownership, measures of phys-
ical and cognitive impairment and diagnosis of diabetes, cancer, stroke, heat attack and
respiratory problems.
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3.5 Results
First, we estimate whether having long-term care insurance influences the probability of
accessing Medicare covered home health aide, skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility
and inpatient hospital visits. We estimate four bivariate probit models as described with
equations (3.1) and (3.2). In both equations the regressors Xl and X2 include age, gender,
race, home ownership, number of limitations in ADLs, and diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease,
diabetes, cancer, stroke, heat attack and respiratory problems. Gender is defined to be
one for male and zero for female; race is one if the person is white and zero if the person
is black, Hispanic, American Indian or Asian; home ownership is defined to be one if the
person owns a home and zero otherwise; the number of limitations in ADLs ranges from
zero to six; and the diagnosis are also dummies equal to one in the presence of the disease
and equal to zero otherwise. Presence of children living within 25 miles is our instrument
for having long-term care insurance and is included only in X2.
We expect that advanced age would lead to higher probability of using Medicare covered
services as older people are more likely to need long-term care and we expect women to
be more likely to use Medicare covered services because they live longer than men. Being
white should decrease the probability of using Medicare services, while the direction of the
impact of home ownership, which is a proxy for assets, and of a diagnosis of Alzheimer's
disease on Medicare services use is not clear. We also expect that increasing number of
limitations in the ADLs and having a diagnosis of diabetes, cancer, stroke, heart attack,
and a respiratory illness will increase the probability of using Medicare covered long-term
care services.
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The results from the bivariate probit estimations are presented in Tables 3.4 through 3.7
where the estimations of the marginal effect and standard errors of the insurance variable
are reported. The most important finding from these estimations is that having private
long-term care insurance decreases the probability of using home health aide services, while
it has no impact on the probability of using skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility or
hospital based services.
In addition, we find that more limitations in the ADLs increase the probability of using
home health aide, skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility and hospital based services,
while being diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease decreases the probability of using those
services. Increasing age leads to higher probability of using home based and skilled nursing
facility services, while home ownership increases the probability of using home health aide
services.
Further, we estimate the impact of insurance and demographic and health characteristics
on the number of home health aide, skilled nursing home and skilled nursing facility visits,
on the number of days spent in a hospital, and on the expenditures for each of these services
per year. We estimate equation (3.3) described in the previous section and the results of
the estimates are reported in Tables 3.8 through 3.11.
The most important results from these estimations are that the privately insured use
fewer Medicare covered home health aide visits than do the non-privately insured and
have lower total expenditures for these visits. Insurance, however, has no impact on the
frequency of use and expenditures for skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility and
inpatient hospital services.
The results also indicate that the number of home based and facility based visits and
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the expenditures for those visits increase with the number of ADL limitations and decrease
if a person has Alzheimer's disease. Further, advancing age leads to an increase in the
number of visits and expenditures for home health aide and skilled nursing facility services,
and to an increase in the number of skilled nursing home visits. Being male is associated
with an increase in the number of days spent in a hospital and the associated expenditures,
and people who own their homes have higher number of home health visits and higher
expenditures for them.
Different diseases are significant in the different models, but whenever they are signif-
icant, having a certain condition increases the probability, frequency and expenditures for
the particular service.
3.6 Conclusion
The estimation results show that when we compare insured elders who use long-term care
services to non-insured elders, having long-term care insurance decreases the probability of
using home health aid services, the number of these services and the associated expendi-
tures per year. Insurance has no impact on the probability of using, on the frequency of
use and expenditures for skilled nursing home, skilled nursing facility and hospital based
service. Since approximately fifty percent of the people who buy long-term care insurance
end up using it, we can say that as more individuals purchase private long-term care in-
surance policies, the use of the Medicare covered home health aide visits and the aggregate
expenditures for those visits should decline. The findings in this study, therefore, support
the proposition that patterns of service use in the private market can and do have an effect
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on the use of publicly financed long-term care expenditures. From a policy perspective,
encouraging the growth in the long-term care insurance market, should lead to a decrease
in the use of selected publicly financed Medicare covered long-term care services.
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3.7 Appendix
Lets assume that in the following latent variable model, the regressor Y2 is endogenous.
yr == ZI <51 + CtlY2 + Ul, Yl == 1 if Y; > 0, 0 otherwise, (3.4)
Further, that regressor is a function of observable characteristics as described in equation
(3.2):
Y2 == z<52 + U2, Y2 == 1 if Y2 > 0, 0 otherwise, (3.5)
and the error terms in equations (3.4) and (3.5) are with mean zero, variance one, have
bivariate normal distribution and are correlated, cov(Ul, U2) = p. If the correlation p -I 0,
then a probit estimation of equation (3.4) is inconsistent, Wooldridge pg. 477, (2002).
Equation (3.4) could be estimated with a two-step approach suggested by Rivers and
Voung (1998) when the endogenous variable Y2 is continuous. Since, however, Y2 is continu-
ous the two-step procedure does not produce consistent estimates. According to Wooldrdge
pg. 478 (2002) "For this two-step procedure to work, we would have to have P(Y1 = liz) =
the indicator function 1[.) is nonlinear, we cannot pass the expected value through.
To derive the log-likelihood function for maximum likelihood analysis, we combine the
four possible outcomes (Yl == 1 or 0 and Y2 == 1 or 0), where
(3.6)
1 f-~ 1
P(Y1 = 11Y2 = 0, z) = 1 _ <I>(Z<>2) 1-
00
<I>[(Z1<>1 + Q1Y2 + pV2)!(1 - p2)z)cp(V2)dv2' (3.7)
P(YI == 0IY2 == 1, z) == 1 - m( \') roo <I>[(Z1<>1 + Q1Y2 + pV2)!(1 - p2)~)cp(V2)dv2' (3.8)
"±' ZU2 J-Z82
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and
where V2 is the argument of integration10 .
lOEvans and Schwab (1995) and Greene (1998) also use this approach.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics-use of Medicare covered long-term care services by insurance
status 1
Home health care services
Use of home health aide services
Number of visits, home health aide services
Total expenditures for home health aide services
Skilled nursing home care
Use of skilled nursing home health services
Number of visits, skilled nursing home services
Total expenditures for skilled nursing home services
Skilled nursing facility care
Use of skilled nursing facility services
Number of visits, skilled nursing facility services
Total expenditures for skilled nursing facility services
Insured Non-insured
18%*** 25%
10*** 25
$650*** $1,470
35% 36%
9*** 15
$1,017** $1,340
11% 8%
3 2
$847 $679
Inpatient hospital care
Use of inpatient hospitalization services
Number of visits, inpatient hospitalization services
Total expenditures for inpatient hospitalization services
34%*
5
$5,244
39%
6
$5,258
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
IThe summary statistics are based on a sample of 1331 insured and 541 non-insured elders.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics-demographic and health characteristics by insurance status
Variable
Age
Race (l=white)
Gender (l=male)
Home ownership (l=own a home)
Presence of child/children living within 25 miles (l=yes)
Number of ADL limitations
Alzheimer's disease (l=diagnosed with the disease)
Diabetes (l=diagnosed with the disease)
Cancer (1=diagnosed with the disease)
Stroke (l=diagnosed with the disease)
Heart attack (1=diagnosed with the disease)
Respiratory problem (l=diagnosed with the disease)
Observations
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Insured
79***
0.97***
0.34
0.80***
0.56***
3.75***
0.25***
0.02***
0.05***
0.28***
0.06
0.04***
541
Non-insured
81
0.83
0.32
0.53
0.68
2.77
0.10
0.21
0.09
0.13
0.06
0.27
1331
Table 3.3: Probit estimation-ownership of long-term care insurance
Independent variables
Presence of children living within 25 miles
Age
Race
Gender
Home ownership
Constant
Observations
Coefficients
-0.289
(4.35)***
-0.014
(3.23)***
0.998
(7.56)***
-0.014
(0.20)
0.658
(9.19)***
-0.564
(1.45)
1872
Marginal effects
-0.096
(4.35)**
-0.005
(3.23)**
0.239
(7.56)**
-0.004
(0.20)
0.201
(9.19)**
1872
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.4: Bivariate probit using presence of children living within 25 miles as an instrument
and probit estimations-home health care services
Using/not using home
health care services
Insurance
Age
Race
Gender
Home ownership
Number of ADL limitations
Alzheimer's
Diabetes
Cancer
Stroke
Heart Attack
Respiratory problem
Constant
Rho
Prob > X2 = 0.4335
Observations
Bivariate probit
Marginal effect for insurance
-0.152
(2.22)**
0.010
(2.62)***
-0.050
(0.45)
0.090
(1.18)
0.200
(2.32)**
0.170
(8.02)***
-0.320
(2.57)***
0.100
(0.85)
0.200
(1.62)
0.370
(3.83)***
0.110
(0.82)
0.160
(1.44)
-2.350
(5.68)***
0.143
1872
Probit
Marginal effects for all variables
-0.098
(4.03)***
0.004
(3.19)***
-0.026
(0.88)
0.026
(1.22)
0.047
(2.25)**
0.045
(8.25)***
-0.097
(3.33)***
0.047
(1.66)
0.066
(1.79)
0.104
(3.87)***
0.029
(0.71)
0.067
(2.65)***
1872
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.5: Bivariate probit using presence of children living within 25 miles as an instrument
and probit estimations-skilled nursing home services
Using/not using skilled
nursing home services
Insurance
Age
Race
Gender
Home ownership
Number of ADL limitations
Alzheimer's
Diabetes
Cancer
Stroke
Heart Attack
Respiratory problem
Constant
Rho
Prob > X2 = 0.6458
Observations
Bivariate probit
Marginal effect for insurance
-0.047
(0.46)
0.010
(3.13)***
-0.050
(0.45)
0.020
(0.24)
0.090
(1.08)
0.130
(6.70)***
-0.360
(3.11)***
0.200
(1.86)*
0.220
(1.93)**
0.370
(4.03)***
0.370
(2.82)***
0.250
(2.38)**
-2.040
(5.33)***
0.077
1872
Probit
Marginal effects for all variables
-0.001
(0.05)
0.005
(3.59)***
-0.025
(0.71)
0.006
(0.26)
0.025
(1.00)
0.047
(7.44)***
-0.134
(3.98)***
0.089
(2.66)***
0.088
(2.03)**
0.132
(4.24)***
0.139
(2.78)***
0.105
(3.52)***
1872
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.6: Bivariate probit using presence of children living within 25 miles as an instrument
and probit estimations-skilled nursing facility services
Using/not using skilled
nursing facility services
Insurance
Age
Race
Gender
Home ownership
Number of ADL limitations
Alzheimer's
Diabetes
Cancer
Stroke
Heart Attack
Respiratory problem
Constant
Rho
Prob > X2 = 0.2470
Observations
Bivariate probit
Marginal effect for insurance
0.078
(1.30)
0.010
(1.79)*
0.010
(0.05)
0.070
(0.71)
-0.050
(0.51)
0.110
(4.12)***
-0.400
(2.66)***
0.030
(0.24)
0.030
(0.19)
0.090
(0.70)
0.150
(0.92)
0.270
(2.23)**
-2.760
(5.35)***
-0.207
1872
Probit
Marginal effects for all variables
0.020
(1.22)
0.001
(1.51)
0.008
(0.41)
0.010
(0.71)
0.001
(0.09)
0.017
(4.80)***
-0.040
(2.32)**
-0.005
(0.29)
0.002
(0.08)
0.021
(1.31)
0.028
(1.09)
0.031
(1.82)*
1872
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.7: Bivariate probit using presence of children living within 25 miles as an instrument
and probit estimations-inpatient hospital visits
Using/not using inpatient
hospital care
Insurance
Age
Race
Gender
Home ownership
Number of ADL limitations
Alzheimer's
Diabetes
Cancer
Stroke
Heart Attack
Respiratory problem
Constant
Rho
Prob > X2 = 0.1464
Observations
Bivariate probit
Marginal effect for insurance
-0.142
(1.61)
0.000
(0.64)
0.080
(0.82)
0.100
(1.53)
0.090
(1.15)
0.100
(5.46)***
-0.200
(1.80)*
0.160
(1.45)
0.360
(3.15)***
0.260
(2.94)***
0.700
(5.23)***
0.370
(3.70)***
-1.110
(2.93)***
0.225
1872
Probit
Marginal effects for all variables
-0.012
(0.40)
0.002
(1.28)
0.008
(0.24)
0.040
(1.60)
0.010
(0.38)
0.033
(5.24)***
-0.103
(2.98)***
0.094
(2.77)***
0.151
(3.40)***
0.080
(2.55)***
0.265
(5.04)***
0.181
(5.99)***
1872
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.8: Home health aide services
Independent variables Tobit estimation
(1) (2)
N umber of visits Expenditures per year
Insurance -67.063 -3,817.890
(5.17)*** (4.82)***
Age 2.336 132.521
(3.69)*** (3.42)***
Race -18.536 -875.356
(1.33) (1.02)
Gender 5.728 285.951
(0.56) (0.46)
Home ownership 20.874 1,079.130
(2.03)** (1.71)*
Number of ADL limitations 25.282 1,545.450
(8.95)*** (8.93)***
Alzheimer's -56.988 -3,584.530
(3.46)*** (3.55)***
Diabetes 27.412 1,510.190
(2.08)** (1.87)*
Cancer 31.450 2,021.860
(1.88)* (1.98)**
Stroke 49.895 3,000.030
(4.12)*** (4.05)***
Heart Attack 11.224 593.352
(0.59) (0.51)
Respiratory problem 25.902 1,629.450
(2.20)** (2.26)**
Constant -381.050 -22,648.880
(6.64)*** (6.44)***
Observations 1872 1872
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.9: Skilled nursing home services
Independent variables Tobit estimation
(1) (2)
Number of visits Expenditures per year
Insurance -6.022 2,176.040
(1.34) (1.12)
Age 0.741 139.686
(3.19)*** (1.36)
Race -8.855 170.144
(1.71)* (0.07)
Gender 1.236 1,035.910
(0.33) (0.63)
Home ownership 3.021 -448.140
(0.80) (0.27)
Number of ADL limitations 7.649 2,114.020
(7.76)*** (4.55)***
Alzheimer's -21.022 -6,415.410
(3.69)*** (2.45)***
Diabetes 19.417 -1,110.540
(3.99)*** (0.48)
Cancer 20.050 -669.528
(3.23)*** (0.23)
Stroke 14.190 2,372.420
(3.16)*** (1.24)
Heart Attack 22.240 2,512.340
(3.25)*** (0.86)
Respiratory problem 12.786 2,810.040
(2.92)*** (1.44)
Constant -111.790 -44,809.750
(5.40)*** (4.65)***
Observations 1872 1872
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.10: Skilled nursing facility services
Independent variables Tobit estimation
(1) (2)
Number of visits Expenditures per year
Insurance 5.458 -218.506
(0.84) (0.51)
Age 0.587 66.418
(1.69)* (2.99)***
Race 3.152 -704.962
(0.38) (1.42)
Gender 3.765 120.292
(0.68) (0.34)
Home ownership 0.917 139.363
(0.16) (0.39)
Number of ADL limitations 7.227 742.308
(4.62)*** (7.87)***
Alzheimer's -19.148 -2,093.310
(2.20)** (3.85)***
Diabetes -4.284 1,881.500
(0.55) (4.04)***
Cancer 1.988 2,034.430
(0.21) (3.43)***
Stroke 9.752 1,410.700
(1.52) (3.29)***
Heart Attack 12.014 2,106.750
(1.24) (3.22)***
Respiratory problem 10.147 1,242.380
(1.55) (2.96)***
Constant -164.840 -10,530.780
(5.07)*** (5.32)***
Observations 1872 1872
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.11: Inpatient hospital services
Independent variables Tobit estimation
(1) (2)
Number of visits Expenditures per year
Insurance 0.118 847.170
(0.06) (0.49)
Age -0.041 -104.194
(0.44) (1.16)
Race -1.954 -1,673.040
(0.93) (0.83)
Gender 3.012 2,761.410
(2.01)** (1.93)**
Home ownership -0.824 -75.238
(0.54) (0.05)
Number of ADL limitations 2.182 2,119.280
(5.55)*** (5.64)***
Alzheimer's -9.271 -8,811.630
(4.05)*** (4.04)***
Diabetes 4.883 4,044.080
(2.48)*** (2.14)**
Cancer 8.057 8,050.550
(3.25)*** (3.40)***
Stroke 5.202 2,837.920
(2.83)*** (1.61)
Heart Attack 11.367 12,097.500
(4.16)*** (4.64)***
Respiratory problem 10.612 9,149.050
(6.09)*** (5.49)***
Constant -16.292 -10,831.610
(1.98)** (1.38)
Observations 1872 1872
t-statistics in parentheses
*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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